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Abstract
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are
two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff ma-
trix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game
by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas.
Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games.
We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increas-
ing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation
both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for
weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic
results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for
finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial
structure.
keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary graph theory, Evolution
of cooperation, Spatial games
1. Introduction
In the typical setting of evolutionary game theory, the individual has to adopt
one of several strategies (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Weibull, 1997; Friedman,
1998; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003; Nowak, 2004; Vincent &
1E-mail:hcj@sejong.ac.kr
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Brown, 2005; Gokhale & Traulsen, 2011). For example in a standard coopera-
tive dilemma (Hauert et al., 2006; Nowak, 2012; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Hauert
et al., 2014), the individual can choose between cooperation and defection. Nat-
ural selection tends to oppose cooperation unless a mechanism for evolution of
cooperation is at work (Nowak, 2006a). In optional games there is also the
possibility not to play the game (Kitcher, 1993; Batali & Kitcher, 1995; Hauert
et al., 2002; Hauert, 2002; Szabo´ & Hauert, 2002a; De Silva et al., 2009; Rand
& Nowak, 2011). The individual player has to choose whether to participate
in the game (by cooperating or defecting) or to opt out. Opting out leads to
fixed “loner’s payoff”. This loner’s payoff is forfeited if one decides to play the
game. Thus there is a cost for playing the game. Optional games tend to lead
to relaxed social dilemmas (Michor & Nowak, 2002; Hauert et al., 2006). They
have also been used to study the effect of costly punishment (by peers and in-
stitutions) on evolution of cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Nakamaru &
Iwasa, 2005; Hauert et al., 2007; Sigmund, 2007; Traulsen et al., 2009; Hilbe &
Sigmund, 2010). There is also a relationship between optional games and empty
places in spatial settings (Nowak et al., 1994).
Here we study the effect of optional games on cycles and on complete graphs
(van Veelen & Nowak, 2012). Cycles and complete graphs are on opposite ends
of the spectrum of spatial structure. Most graphs will lead to an evolutionary
dynamics between these two extremes. Evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman
et al., 2005; Santos & Pacheco, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabo´ & Fa´th, 2007;
Fu et al., 2007a,b; Santos et al., 2008; Perc & Szolnoki, 2010; Perc, 2011; Allen
et al., 2013; Maciejewski, 2014; Allen & Nowak, 2014) is an approach to study the
effect of population structure on evolutionary dynamics (Nowak & May, 1992;
Nakamaru et al., 1997; Tarnita et al., 2009b,a; Nowak et al., 2010; Tarnita et al.,
2011). Using stochastic evolutionary dynamics for games in finite populations
(Foster & Young, 1990; Challet & Zhang, 1997; Taylor et al., 2004; Nowak et al.,
2004; Imhof & Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2006), we notice that the number of
different loner strategies has an important effect on selection between strategies
that occur in the game. Increasing the number of ways to opt out (or, increasing
mutational bias toward (Garcia & Traulsen, 2012) loner strategies) in general
favors evolution of cooperation.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of the
basic model and list our key results. In Section 3 we calculate abundance in the
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low mutation limit. It is used to investigate the conditions for strategy selection
in the weak selection limit in Section 4 and in the strong selection limit in
Section 5. We calculate these conditions for optional games with simplified
prisoner’s dilemma games in Section 6. We then analyze strategy selection
numerically for finite mutation rate as well as finite selection intensity in low
mutation in Section 7. In our concluding remarks in Section 8, we summarize
and discuss the implications of our findings.
2. Model and main results
We consider stochastic evolutionary dynamics of populations on graphs. In
particular, we investigate the condition for one strategy to be favored over the
others in the limit of low mutation and for two different reproduction processes,
birth-death (BD) updating and death-birth (DB) updating on cycles. We com-
pare the results with those for the Moran Process (MP) on the complete graph.
The fitness of an individual is determined by the payoff from the non-repeated
matrix games with its nearest neighbors. We use exponential fitness,
fr = e
wPr , (1)
for the individual at the site r, where Pr is its accumulated payoff from the games
with its neighbors. The intensity of selection, w, is a parameter representing
how strongly the fitness of an individual depends on the its payoff.
We first study a general matrix game whose payoff matrix is given by A =
[ aij ], i.e., a game that an individual using strategy Si receives aij as a payoff
when it plays with an individual with strategy Sj . Then we apply our finding
to an optional prisoner’s dilemma game to find a condition for evolution of
cooperation.
We calculate abundance (frequencies in the stationary distribution) of strate-
gies in the low mutation limit, where mutation rate u goes to zero, and find the
condition that strategy Si is more abundant than strategy Sj . For low mutation,
abundance can be written in terms of fixation probabilities which we obtain in
a closed form for general w. Although the formal expression of abundance is
useful for numerical calculation, the complexity of the expression makes it hard
for us to understand the strategy selection mechanism intuitively.
For low intensity of selection (w → 0), however, the fixation probability
reduces to a linear expression in aij with clear interpretation. The condition for
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strategy selection is then given by a simple linear inequality in terms of payoff
matrix elements. This is the case even for the large population limit of N →∞.
However, when considering the limits of weak selection (w → 0) and large
population (N →∞), the condition for strategy selection depends on the order
in which these limits are taken. We therefore consider two different large popu-
lation, weak selection limits: the wN limit and the Nw imit. In the wN limit,
w goes to zero before N goes to infinity such that Nw is much smaller than 1.
In the Nw limit, N goes to infinity before w goes to zero such that Nw is much
larger than 1.
2.1. wN limit
We first calculate the fixation probability, ρik, which is the probability that
a singe Si takes over the whole population of the strategy Sk for the w → 0
limit. It can be written as
ρik =
1
N
+ dik w. (2)
Here, the “biased drift”, dik is defined by
dik =

1
2 lik − 12N sik for BD
1
4 lik − 14N sik for DB
1
4 lik − 112 sik for MP
(3)
with the anti-symmetric term lik and the symmetric term sik given by
lik = σNaii + aik − aki − σNakk
sik = σN (aii − aik − aki + akk) . (4)
The structure factor, σ
N
for the population of the size N , is given by
σ
N
=
{
1− 2/N for BD & MP
3− 8/N for DB. (5)
Using fixation probabilities of Eq. (2), we then calculate abundance in the
low mutation limit and show that strategy Si is more abundant than strategy Sj
when ∑
k
lik >
∑
k
ljk (6)
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as previously known (Nowak et al., 2010; Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2006). The fix-
ation probability obtained for a general 2 × 2 matrix game is also applied to
calculate abundance of cooperator and defectors in optional prisoner’s dilemma
game(Szabo´ & Hauert, 2002b) with (n+ 2) strategies, cooperator (C), defector
(D) and n different types of loners, L1, · · · , Ln. The payoff matrix is given by
C D L1 · · · Ln
C
D
L1
...
Ln

R S g · · · g
T P g · · · g
g g g · · · g
...
...
...
. . .
...
g g g · · · g

.
(7)
When two cooperators meet, both get payoff R. When two defectors meet, they
get payoff P . If a cooperator meets a defector, the defector gets the payoff T
while the cooperator get the payoff S. Loners get payoff g always. Cooperators
or defectors also get payoff g when they meet a loner. Since the n different
types of loners have the same payoff structure, this system is equivalent to to
the population with three strategies, C, D, and a single type of loners, L if the
mutation rate toward L (from C or D) is n times larger than the other way.
In the limit of w goes to zero, we find that the condition for x
C
> x
D
is given
as
σ
N
(n)R+ S > T + σ
N
(n)P, (8)
where
σ
N
(n) =
{ (
1 + 12 n
) (
1− 2N
)
for BD & MP(
1 + 12 n
) (
3− 8N
)
for DB.
(9)
As long as w goes to zero first (Nw  1), inequality (8) is valid even in the
large population limit of N →∞, where the structure factor, σ
N
(n) becomes
σ(n) =
{
1 + 12 n for BD & MP
3 + 32 n for DB.
(10)
If we do not allow any loner type, then n = 0 and σ
N
(n) becomes σ
N
of
Eq. (5) as expected, and cooperators are more abundant than defectors if and
only if ρ
CD
> ρ
DC
. On the other hand, when the number of loner types, n,
goes to infinity, σ becomes infinity and social dilemmas are completely resolved.
Cooperators are more abundant than defectors whenever R > P .
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2.2. Nw limit
We still consider the low selection intensity limit (w → 0) but we take the
large population limit first such that Nw is much larger than 1. In this case, we
can calculate the fixation probability analytically only for BD and DB. Fixation
of Si (invading strategy Sk) is possible only when lik is positive where
lik = σaii + aik − aki − σakk. (11)
The structure factor for infinite population, σ in Eq. (11) is 1 for BD and 3
for DB. When lik is positive, fixation probability, ρik is proportional to lik and
given by
ρik =
{
lik Θ(lik) for BD
1
2 lik Θ(lik) for DB,
(12)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function.
We calculate abundance for the low mutation limit using fixation probabili-
ties given by Eq. (12) for a general 3 strategy game and find conditions for the
abundance xi of strategy Si to be larger than the abundance xj of strategy Sj .
Here i, j, and k are the indices representing three distinct strategies, Si, Sj ,
and Sk. If both lij and lik are positive, Sj and Sk cannot invade Si and we have
xi = 1 and xj = xk = 0, i.e., xi > xj always. By the same token, xi cannot
be larger than xj when both lji and ljk are positive. If lki and lkj are positive,
both xi and xj are zero. The only non-trivial case is when three strategies,
show rock-paper-scissors-like characteristics in terms of lij . For the lij > 0 case
(with ljk > 0 and lki > 0), strategy Si is more abundant than strategy Sj when
lij > lki. For the lji > 0 case (with lik > 0 and lkj > 0), strategy Si is more
abundant than strategy Sj when lji < lkj .
The analysis for three strategy game can be applied to optional prisoner’s
game with n types of loners whose payoff matrix is given by Eq. (7). The con-
dition for x
C
> x
D
can be still written as a linear inequality but the coefficients
of the linear inequality depend on the signs of R − P , R − g, and P − g. For
simplicity, we first assume that R > P without loss of generality. Then, when
P > g, the condition for x
C
> x
D
becomes
R+ S > T + P for BD
3R+ S > T + 3P for DB.
(13)
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For the other case of P < g, the condition for x
C
> x
D
becomes
R+ S > T + P + n(P − g) for BD
3R+ S > T + 3P + 3n(P − g) for DB. (14)
For high intensity of selection (w  1), strategy selection strongly depends
on the number of loner strategies, n. If n is larger than 1, cooperators are
more abundant than defectors as long as g > P . On the other hands, for
n = 1, the condition for x
C
> x
D
depends on the reproduction processes. For
n = 1, we obtain the condition only for the “simplified” prisoner’s dilemma game
(“donation game”) in which the payoffs are described in terms of the benefit,
b and the cost, c of cooperation, R = b − c, S = −c, T = b, P = 0. For BD,
cooperators are always less abundant than defectors as long as g < b. For DB
and MP, x
C
is larger than x
D
if
c < b/2 for DB
c < g for MP.
(15)
2.3. Numerical analysis
Our analytic results are obtained in the two extreme limits of selection
strength (w → 0 and w →∞) in the zero mutation limit. For finite values of w
(with low mutation rate), we solve conditions for x
C
> x
D
numerically, using
calculated abundance from fixation probabilities. For finite mutation rates, we
perform a series of Monte Carlo simulations and measure abundance to obtain
the condition for strategy selection.
In particular, we consider a simplified prisoner’s dilemma game with one type
of loners (n = 1) in which the analytic conditions for x
C
> x
D
[inequalities (8),
(13) and (14)] become
c < N−65N−6 b for BD & MP
c < 7N−2411N−24 b for DB,
(16)
for the wN limit, and
g > 2c for BD
g > 43 (c− b/2) for DB,
(17)
for the Nw limit.
We first confirm these conditions numerically with a finite but small w in the
low mutation limit. Abundance of each strategy is calculated for Nw = 0.01
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and Nw = 100 (with N = 104). We find more cooperators than defectors when
inequality (16) is satisfied for Nw = 0.01 and inequality (17) for Nw = 100.
When Nw is much smaller than 1, cooperators in BD and those in MP are
more abundant than defectors in the same region in the parameter space as
inequality (16) predicts. However, they are different for general Nw. When Nw
is much larger than 1, cooperators are less abundant than defectors always for
BD but we find more cooperators than defectors when g > c for MP.
For finite mutation rate, we investigate abundance by Monte Carlo simula-
tion. We start from a random arrangement of three strategies on a cycle (BD
and DB) or a complete graph (MP) with N = 50 sites. Population evolves
with BD, DB, or MP updating processes with the mutation rate, u = 0.0002.
We monitor the time evolution of the average frequencies and see if the popu-
lation evolves to a steady state in which average frequency remains constant.
We measure abundance, the frequency average in the steady state, and find
that abundance in our simulations agrees quite well with calculations in the low
mutation limits using fixation probabilities.
3. Derivation of general expressions for fixation probability and abun-
dance
We now begin our derivation of the results presented above. We begin by
obtaining general expressions for fixation probability and abundance that are
valid for any population size and selection intensity. These expressions are
obtained first for a general 3×3 matrix game, and then for the optional prisoners’
dilemma game.
When there are mutations, the population will not evolve to an absorbing
state of one kind. Yet, in many cases, it is expected for them to evolve to a steady
state in which the frequency of each type (in a sufficiently large population) stays
constant. We use the term “abundance” for frequency in the steady state. For a
small population, frequencies may oscillate with time through mutation-fixation
cycles, especially when the mutation rate is very small. In this case, abundance
is defined as the time average of frequencies over fixation cycles.
In this section, we consider abundance in the low mutation limit, in which the
mutation rate u goes to zero. We imagine an invasion of a mutant in the mono-
strategy population and we ignore the possibility of further mutation during
the fixation sweep. In this low mutation limit, abundance can be expressed
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in terms of fixation probabilities. We first calculate fixation probabilities for
general selection intensity w and present them in a closed form for BD and DB.
Then, we present abundance in terms of fixation probabilities.
3.1. Fixation probability
We consider the fixation probability of A (invading a population that consists
of B) for a general 2x2 matrix game with the payoff matrix,
A B
A
B
(
a b
c d
)
.
In general, the fixation probability of A is given by
ρ
AB
=
[
1 +
N−1∑
m=1
m∏
NA=1
T−NA
T+NA
]−1
(18)
where T±NA is the probability that the number of A becomes NA ± 1 from
NA (Nowak, 2006b). When new offspring appear in nearest neighbor sites, as
they do for BD and DB, only one connected cluster of invaders can form on a
cycle and T±NA can be easily calculated. In fact, with exponential fitness, ρAB is
given in a closed form.
For BD, the fixation probability can be written in the form of
ρ
AB
=
f
g + h yN
, (19)
with
f = ew(a+b) − ew(c+d)
g = ew(a+b) − ew(c+d) + ew(a−b+c+d)
h = ew(2a−c−2d)
[
ew(a+b+c) − ew(a+b+d) − ew(2c+d)
]
y = ew(c+d−a−b), (20)
when a + b 6= c + d. Note that both denominator and numerator of the right
hand side of Eq. (19) are zero when a + b = c + d. For this singular case, ρ
AB
can be directly calculated from Eq. (18) and is given by
ρ
AB
=
1
1 + e2w(b−c) − 2 ew(a−b) +N ew(a−b) . (21)
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In the limit of a + b → c + d, Eq. (19) [with Eq. (20)] becomes identical to
Eq. (21). Hence, we can write the fixation probability of A for BD on a cycle
as Eq. (19) for general case if it is understood as the limiting value when both
denominator and numerator becomes zero.
For DB, the fixation probability can be also written in the form of Eq. (19)
but now with
f = ew(3a+b) − ew(c+3d)
g =
(
ew(3a+b) − ew(c+3d)
) 3 + e2w(d−b)
2
+
ew(c+d)
(
e2wb + e2wd
) (
ew(a+b) + e2wd
) (
e2wa + ew(c+d)
)
2e2wb
(
ew(a+b) + ew(c+d)
)
h =
[
ew(3a+b)
(
e2wb + e2wd
) (
e2wa + ew(c+d)
)4]
×
[ (
e2wa + 3e2wc
) (
ew(c+3d) − ew(3a+b))
2e3w(c+d)
(
ew(a+b) + e2wd
)4
(e2wa + e2wc)
]
− e
2w(2a+b)
(
e2wb + e2wd
) (
e2wa + ew(c+d)
)5
2e3w(c+d)
(
ew(a+b) + e2wd
)3 (
ew(a+b) + ew(c+d)
)
y =
e−w(3a+b−c−3d) + ew(c+d−2a)
1 + ew(c+d−2a)
, (22)
when 3a+ b 6= c+ 3d. We can also show that Eq. (19) [with Eq. (22)] becomes
the fixation probability for 3a+b = c+3d if we take the limit of 3a+b→ c+3d.
For MP, the fixation probability given by Eq. (18) cannot be written in a
closed form in general but reduces (Traulsen et al., 2008) to
ρ
AB
=
(
N−1∑
m=1
e−w[
(a−b−c+d)
2(N−1) m(m+1)− (a−bN+dN−d)N−1 m]
)−1
. (23)
For a+ d = b+ c, the summation in Eq. (23) can be calculated exactly and we
have
ρ
AB
=
ew(a−bN+dN−d)/(N−1) − 1
ewN(a−bN+dN−d)/(N−1) − 1 . (24)
For a+ d 6= b+ c, the summation can be approximated by an integral (Traulsen
et al., 2008) and we have
ρ
AB
≈
erf
(√
w
u [u+ v]
)
− erf
(√
w
u v
)
erf
(√
w
u [uN + v]
)
− erf
(√
w
u v
) . (25)
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Here, u = (a − b − c + d)/(2N − 2), v = (−a + bN − dN + d)/(2N − 2) and
erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−y
2
dy is the error function. The summation in Eq. (23) can be
also calculated exactly for the wN limit (see Section 4) where the exponential
term can be linearized.
3.2. Abundance in the low mutation limit
Let xi be the abundance of strategy Si, whose payoff matrix is given by
S1 S2 S3
S1
S2
S3

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
 . (26)
Then, in the low mutation limit, we expect the abundance vector, ~x = (x1, x2, x3)
can be written as
~x = ~xT, (27)
with the transfer matrix
T =

1− ρ21 − ρ31 ρ21 ρ31
ρ12 1− ρ12 − ρ32 ρ32
ρ13 ρ23 1− ρ13 − ρ23
 .
Here, ρij is the fixation probability of strategy Si (invading the population of
strategy Sj). A (unnormalized) left eigen-vector of T with the unit eigen value,
~xu = (xu1 , x
u
2 , x
u
3 ) is given by
xu1 = ρ12ρ13 + ρ13ρ32 + ρ12ρ23
xu2 = ρ23ρ21 + ρ21ρ13 + ρ23ρ31
xu3 = ρ31ρ32 + ρ32ρ21 + ρ31ρ12. (28)
Once we calculate all fixation probabilities ρij , the steady state frequencies, xi
can be obtained by normalizing xui ;
xi = x
u
i /
∑
j
xuj . (29)
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3.3. Optional prisoner’s dilemma game
The fixation probabilities obtained in Section 3.1 can be used to calculate
abundance of cooperators and defectors in optional prisoner’s dilemma game.
Here, we consider the game with (n + 2) strategies, cooperator (C), defector
(D) and n different loners, L1, · · · , Ln whose payoff matrix is given by Eq. (7).
We introduce n different types of loners to investigate how the condition for the
emergence of cooperation varies with the number of loner types, n.
Let x
C
, x
D
, and x
Lj
be the abundance of C, D, and Lj , respectively. Then,
for low mutation, the abundance vector ~˜x = (x
C
, x
D
, x
L1
, · · · , x
Ln
) can be written
as
~˜x = ~˜x T˜ (30)
with
T˜ =

T˜CC ρDC ρL1C · · · ρLnC
ρ
CD
T˜DD ρL1D · · · ρLnD
ρ
CL1
ρ
DL1
T˜L1L1 · · · ρLnL1
...
...
...
. . .
...
ρ
CLn
ρ
DLn
ρ
L1Ln
· · · T˜LnLn

. (31)
As before, ρij is the fixation probability that an Si takes over the population
of Sj and T˜ii = 1−
∑
j 6=i ρij with the convention that strategy 1 is C, strategy 2
is D, and strategy Si is Li−2 for i > 2. Since the payoffs of the games involving
loners are independent of the loner type, so are the fixation probabilities involv-
ing Lj . By denoting ρiLj by ρiL , Eqs. (30) and (31) can be rewritten in terms
of the total frequency of loners x
L
=
∑
j xLj as
~x = ~xT (32)
with ~x = (x
C
, x
D
, x
L
), where
T =

1− ρ
DC
− nρ
LC
ρ
DC
nρ
LC
ρ
CD
1− ρ
CD
− nρ
LD
nρ
LD
ρ
CL
ρ
DL
1− ρ
CL
− ρ
DL
 . (33)
The evolution dynamics of Eq. (32) with the transfer matrix, T of Eq. (33)
can be interpreted as biasing the mutation rate toward loner strategies. The
mutation rate toward L (from C or D) is n times larger than the other way.
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The abundance vector of three strategies, C, D, and L, is proportional to the
left eigen-vectors of T with the unit eigen value, ~xu = (xu
C
, xu
D
, xu
L
), given by
xu
C
= ρ
CD
ρ
CL
+ nρ
CL
ρ
LD
+ ρ
CD
ρ
DL
xu
D
= ρ
DL
ρ
DC
+ ρ
DC
ρ
CL
+ nρ
DL
ρ
LC
xu
L
= n2ρ
LC
ρ
LD
+ nρ
LD
ρ
DC
+ nρ
LC
ρ
CD
. (34)
Here ρ
CD
, ρ
CL
, . . . are fixation probabilities between three strategies with payoff
matrix,
C D L
C
D
L

R S g
T P g
g g g
 . (35)
4. Analysis of the wN limit
We now consider the results of Section 3 under the wN limit. This limit is
obtained by taking the w → 0 limit for fixed N , and then taking the N → ∞
limit of the result. We calculate abundance in terms of fixation probabilities in
the wN limit and analyze the condition for the cooperators are more abundant
than defectors.
4.1. Fixation probability
As w goes to zero, the fixation probability for BD, Eq. (19) [with Eq. (20)]
becomes
ρ
AB
=
1
N
+
w
2N2
[ (
N2 − 3N + 2) a+ (N2 +N − 2) b ]
− w
2N2
[ (
N2 −N + 2) c+ (N2 −N − 2) d ]
=
1
N
+
w
2
[
(σ
N
a+ b− c− σ
N
d)− σN
N
(a− b− c+ d)
]
, (36)
where σ
N
= 1 − 2/N . In the second line, we divide the w dependent parts as
the sum of the anti-symmetric term and the symmetric term under exchange
of A and B. The symmetric term contributes equally to both ρ
AB
and ρ
BA
and is
irrelevant to determine abundance. For DB, the fixation probability according
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to Eq. (19) [with Eq. (22)] becomes
ρ
AB
=
1
N
+
w
4N2
[ (
3N2 − 11N + 8) a+ (N2 + 3N − 8) b ]
− w
4N2
[ (
N2 − 3N + 8) c+ (3N2 − 5N − 8) d ]
=
1
N
+
w
4
[
(σ
N
a+ b− c− σ
N
d)− σN
N
(a− b− c+ d)
]
, (37)
where σ
N
= 3− 8/N . For MP, the fixation probability cannot be expressed in a
closed form for general w. However, when w goes to zero, it can be calculated
using Eq. (23), and is given by
ρ
AB
=
1
N
+
w
6N
[
(N − 2)a+ (2N − 1)b
]
− w
6N
[
(N + 1)c+ (2N − 4)d
]
=
1
N
+
w
4
[
σ
N
a+ b− c− σ
N
d
]
− w
4
[ σ
N
3
(a− b− c+ d)
]
, (38)
where σ
N
= 1− 2/N .
The fixation probabilities for the three processes, as given by Eqs. (36-38),
can be expressed as
ρ
AB
=
1
N
+ wθa
[
σ
N
a+ b− c− σ
N
d
]
− wθs
[
σ
N
(a− b− c+ d)
]
, (39)
with σ
N
, θa, and θs given by the following table.
σ
N
θa θs
BD 1− 2N 12 12N
DB 3− 8N 14 14N
MP 1− 2N 14 112
(40)
We would like to emphasize that the difference between ρ
AB
and ρ
BA
comes
form the anti-symmetric term. In other words, strategy selection is determined
by the sign of σ
N
a + b − c + σ
N
d. This value is identical for BD on cycle
and MP. The coefficient of the anti-symmetric term, θa for BD and MP would
have been the same if we had normalized the accumulated payoff such that
an individual in a population of mono-strategy has the same fitness both for
BD and MP. For MP, each individual plays games with N − 1 neighbors while
an individual on a cycle has two neighbors. To have the same effective payoff
with individual on a cycle, we need to normalize the accumulated payoff for
MP by multiplying 2/(N − 1). However, for MP, we use Pr in Eq. (1) as
the average payoff which is the accumulated payoff divide by N − 1, following
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the established convention (Nowak, 2006b). Hence, the results for MP using
intensity of selection, w should be compared with those with half of the intensity,
w/2 for BD and DB. We also note that the symmetric terms are of order w/N
for BD and DB on cycles while it is of order w for MP.
Fixation probability in the wN limit is obtained by taking N →∞ limit of
Eq. (39) and Eq. (40);
ρ
AB
=

1
N
[
1 + Nw2 (a+ b− c− d)
]
for BD
1
N
[
1 + Nw4 (3a+ b− c− 3d)
]
for DB
1
N
[
1 + Nw6 (a+ 2b− c− 2d)
]
for MP.
(41)
These results can be understood by considering fixation process as a (biased)
random walk on a one-dimensional lattice. Let T±NA be the probability that the
number of A to be NA ± 1 from NA as introduced in Eq. (18). Then, without
a mutation, we have T−N = T
+
0 = 0. Hence, there are two absorbing states,
the all B state at NA = 0 and the all A state at NA = N . Now, ρAB can be
interpreted as the probability that the random walker reaches the NA = N state
starting from the NA = 1 state. For large N , the master equation describing
population dynamics can be approximated by a Fokker-Plank equation with
(biased) drift, vNA , and the (stochastic) diffusion, dNA , which are approximately
given by vNA ≈ (T+NA−T−NA) and dNA ≈
(
T+NA + T
−
NA
)
/N (Traulsen et al., 2006).
For small w, drift velocity is proportional to w, and the relative contribution of
the diffusion term, dNA/vNA is asymptotically given by
dNA
vNA
∼ 1Nw . For weak
selection (Nw  1), where dNA/vNA is large, the fixation probability is mainly
determined by the (stochastic) diffusion term, 1/N and can be written as
ρ
AB
=
1
N
+ v
AB
. (42)
The perturbation term, v
AB
is the (weighted) average drift velocity over NA = 1
to NA = N − 1 state and is given by
v
AB
= 〈vNA〉=¯
∑
NA
φ
NA
(T+NA − T−NA), (43)
where φ
NA
is the frequency of visits to the state NA (the expected sojourn time
at NA). When w is small, the difference between T
+
NA
and T−NA is also small and
“walkers” can diffuse around state NA easily. Then we can treat x = NA/N
as a continuous variable, especially when N is large. Hence, for small w and
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large N , φ satisfies the diffusion equation in one-dimension,
d2φ
dx
= 0, (44)
whose solution is given by
φ
NA
= c1 + c2
NA
N
=
2
N(N − 1)
[
(N − 1)− (N − 2)NA
N
]
≈ 2
N
(
1− NA
N
)
, (45)
for NA = 1, · · · , N − 1. Here, two constants c1 and c2 have been determined
by the boundary conditions, φ
N
= 1N−1φ0 (for neutral drift of w = 0,
φ
N
φ0
=
1/N
1−1/N =
1
N−1 ) and the normalization,
∑
φ
NA
= 1.
Since T±NA = T
± is independent of NA for almost every NA, for BD (except
NA = 1 and NA = N − 1) and DB (except NA = 1, 2, N − 2, and N − 1) on
cycles, v
AB
can be treated as a constant for large N . By considering the motion
of the domain boundary between A and B blocks, we obtain
v
AB
= 〈T+ − T−〉
=
{
w
2 (a+ b− c− d) for BD
w
4 (3a+ b− c− 3d) for DB.
(46)
For MP, T±NA depends NA but vAB can be also easily calculated from φNA of
Eq. (45). During the fixation sweep, the average number of A in the population
is 〈NA〉 =
∑
NA φNA ≈ N/3. In the wN limit, we have
v
AB
≈ w
2
∑
NA
φ
NA
[(a− c)NA + (c− d)(N −NA)]
=
Nw
6
[a− c+ 2(b− d)] . (47)
Inserting v
AB
given by Eq. (46) or (47), into Eq. (42), we recover Eq. (41).
4.2. Strategy selection
Here, we consider the condition for the strategy Si is more abundant than the
strategy Sj , i.e., xi > xj . We can write the formal expression for the condition
xi > xj for the general selection strength and population size using Eqs. (28)
and (19). Although the formal expression may be useful to analyze abundances
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of strategies numerically, it provides little analytic intuition due to the com-
plexity of the expression. Hence, here, we solve the inequalities analytically for
low intensity of selection (w → 0). For finite intensity of selection, we find the
condition for xi > xj numerically in Section 7.
When wN is much smaller than 1, from Eq. (39), the fixation probability,
ρij is written as
ρij =
1
N
[1 + wdij ] (48)
with
dij = θa (σNaii + aij − aji − σNajj )− θsσN ( aii − aij − aji + ajj ) . (49)
Since abundance x1 of strategy S1 is proportional to x
u
1 of Eq. (28), we can
write,
x1 ∝ (1 + wd12) (1 + wd13) + (1 + wd13) (1 + wd32) + (1 + wd12) (1 + wd23)
≈ 3 + w [2(d12 + d13) + d32 + d23]
= 3+w [(d12−d21)+(d13−d31)] + w [(d12+d21) + (d13+d31) + (d32+d23)]
= 3 + w
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
(djk + dkj) + w
3∑
k=1
(d1k − dk1). (50)
In the last step, we use dii = 0. In general, abundance xi of strategy Si can be
calculated similarly;
xi ∝ 3 + w
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
(djk + dkj) + w
3∑
k=1
(dik − dki)
= 3− 2wθsσN
3∑
j=1
∑
k=13
(ajj − ajk − akj + akk)
+ 2wθa
3∑
k=1
(σ
N
aii + aik − aki − σNakk) . (51)
Since the first two terms are independent of i, abundance order is determined by
the third term. In other words, strategy Si is more abundant than strategy Sj
when
3∑
k=1
lik >
3∑
k=1
ljk, (52)
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where
lik = σNaii + aik − aki − σNakk. (53)
Here, inequality (52) is derived for abundance with three strategies. Its gener-
alization with n strategies,
∑n
k=1 lik >
∑n
k=1 ljk, can be derived similarly.
4.3. Optional prisoner’s dilemma game
The analysis used in Section 4.2 can be also applied to strategy selection on
optional prisoner’s dilemma game [with payoff given by Eq. (7)]. Let ∆xu be the
difference between (unnormalized) abundance of C and D, i.e., ∆xu = xu
C
−xu
D
,
where xu
C
and xu
D
are given by Eq. (34). Then, cooperators are more abundant
than defectors when ∆xu is positive. When Nw is much less than 1, we have
∆xu = (ρ
CL
+ ρ
DL
) (ρ
CD
− ρ
DC
) + n (ρ
CL
ρ
LD
− ρ
LC
ρ
DL
)
∝ 2w (dCD − dDC) + nw (dCL + dLD − dLC − dDL)
= 4wθa (σNR+ S − T − σNP ) + 2nwθa [σN (R− g) + σN (g − P )]
= 4wθa
[
2 + n
2
σ
N
R + S − T − 2 + n
2
σ
N
R
]
. (54)
Here θa and σN are given by Eq. (40) and dij is given by Eq. (49) with payoff
matrix element given by Eq. (35). Since x
C
> x
D
when ∆xu is positive, we have
more cooperators than defectors when
σ
N
(n)R+ S > T + σ
N
(n)P (55)
with
σ
N
(n) =
{ (
1 + 12 n
) (
1− 2N
)
for BD & MP(
1 + 12 n
) (
3− 8N
)
for DB.
(56)
For large population limit (N →∞), σ
N
(n) becomes
σ(n) =
{
1 + 12 n for BD & MP
3 + 32 n for DB.
(57)
The structure factor, σ(n) becomes σ of Eq. (5) when n = 0 (without loner
strategy). Then, cooperators are more abundant than defectors when R + S >
T + P for BD & MP and 3R + S > T + 3P for DB as expected. On the other
hand, the social dilemma is completely resolved (x
C
> x
D
whenever R > P )
when the number of loner types, n, goes to infinity.
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We observe that condition (55) for the success of cooperation does not de-
pend on the loner payoff g. This may be counter-intuitive, since the abundance
of loners increases with g, and cooperators fare better when loners increase.
However, in the wN limit, the frequency of loners is a first-order deviation from
n/(n + 2). The effect of this deviation on cooperators is a second-order effect
that disappears in the wN limit.
5. Analysis of the Nw limit
Here, we consider the results of Section 3 under the Nw limit. We first
calculate fixation probability in the large N limit using Eq. (19). The Nw limit
is obtained by taking the w → 0 limit of the result. Once we obtain fixation
probability in this limit, we calculate abundance and find the condition for the
strategy Si is more abundant than the strategy Sj for three strategy games.
5.1. Fixation probability
Fixation probability of Eq. (19) is is valid for general w and N for BD and
DB. When N goes to infinity (with a finite w), ρ
AB
becomes zero if y > 1
since the Nth power term in Eq. (19) becomes infinity. When y < 1, the Nth
power term becomes zero and ρ
AB
of Eq. (19) becomes f/g. Since y < 1 when
a+b < c+d for BD (and when 3a+b < c+3d for DB), the fixation probabilities
in the limit of large population limit are given by
ρ
AB
=
ew(a+b) − ew(c+d)
ew(a+b) − ew(c+d) + ew(a−b+c+d) (58)
when a+ b > c+ d and 0 otherwise for BD, and
ρ
AB
=
[
3 + e2w(d−b)
2
+
ew(c+d)
(
e2wb + e2wd
) (
ew(a+b) + e2wd
) (
e2wa + ew(c+d)
)
2e2wb
(
ew(a+b) + ew(c+d)
) (
ew(3a+b) − ew(c+3d))
]−1
(59)
when 3a+b > c+3d and 0 otherwise for DB. For MP, ρ
AB
can be approximated
by Eq. (25) for large N .
Fixation probability in the Nw limit is obtained by taking w → 0 limit to
Eqs. (58) and (59). In this limit, ρ
AB
becomes
ρ
AB
=
{
w ( a+ b− c− d) Θ( a+ b− c− d) for BD
w (3a+ b− c− 3d) Θ(3a+ b− c− 3d) for DB. (60)
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This result can be also understood from random walk argument on 1D lattice.
Here, Nw is much larger than 1 and hence diffusion to drift-velocity ratio,
d/v ≈ 1/Nw is small. Hence, population dynamics is mainly determined by
the (biased) drift term rather than the stochastic diffusion. Fixation (random
walker at NA = N state) is now possible only when the drift bias is positive for
(almost) everywhere. For BD and DB on cycles, drift velocity is independent
of NA and proportional to σa+ b− c− σd.
5.2. Strategy selection
We now consider the condition for xi > xj in the large population limit with
finite w for BD and DB. As mentioned before, we are comparing abundance xi
and xj in the population with three strategies, Si, Sj and Sk. We first note that
xj and xk are zero when both ρji and ρki are zero [see Eq. (28)]. This is the case
when both lji and lki are negative [see Eq. (12)] where lij = σaii+aij−aji−σajj .
Therefore, 1 = xi > xj = 0 if both lij and lik are positive. By the same token,
0 = xi < xj = 1 when both lji and ljk are positive. If lki and lkj are positive,
both xi and xj are zero. Hence, the condition for xi > xj becomes non-trivial
only when three strategies show rock-paper-scissors characteristics. For the
lij > 0 case (with ljk > 0 and lki > 0), x
u
i and x
u
j in Eq. (28) become ρijρjk and
ρjkρki respectively. Therefore, Si is more abundant than Sj when ρij > ρki.
For the other case of lji > 0 (with lik > 0 and lkj > 0), x
u
i and x
u
j become
ρikρkj and ρjiρik and xi > xj when ρkj > ρji. Hence, there are three cases that
strategy Si is more abundant than strategy Sj in the large population limit;
• case 1 [lij > 0 and lik > 0]: xi > xj always,
• case 2 [lij > 0, ljk > 0, and lki > 0]: xi > xj if ρij > ρki, and
• case 3 [lji > 0, lik > 0, and lkj > 0]: xi > xj if ρji < ρkj .
For the cases 2 and 3, conditions for xi > xj can be understood by integrating
out the role of strategy Sk. For the case 2, influx to strategy Si is ρijxj while
out-flux is ρkixi. Therefore, detailed balance between the abundance of Si
and Sj in the steady state requires
ρijxj = ρkixi. (61)
Hence, xi =
ρij
ρkj
xj is larger than xj if ρij > ρki. For the case 3, influx to
strategy Si is ρkjxj when the role of strategy Sk is integrated out. Since the
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out-flux to strategy Si is ρjixi, we have
ρkjxj = ρjixi (62)
in the steady state, and xi =
ρkj
ρji
xj is larger than xj if ρkj > ρji. From the
large N limit of ρij in Eq. (19), we see that the conditions for xi > xj for the
cases 2 and 3 become
fij gki > fki gij for case 2
fkj gji > fji gkj for case 3.
(63)
Here
fij = αiiαij − αjiαjj
gij = αiiαij − αjiαjj + αiiα−1ij αjiαjj (64)
for BD, and
fij = α
3
iiαij − αjiα3jj
gij =
3fij + α
−1
ij α
2
jjfij
2
+
αjiαjj
(
α2ij + α
2
jj
) (
αiiαij + α
2
jj
) (
α2ii + αjiαjj
)
2α2ij (αiiαij + αjiαjj)
(65)
for DB with αij = e
waij .
Now we consider the Nw limit, where w goes to zero after N goes to infin-
ity. In this case, fij and gij in Eq. (65) become linear in w and ρij becomes
proportional to lij (unless lij < 0 where ρij = 0). The conditions for three cases
for large population become
• case 1 [lij > 0 and lik > 0]: xi > xj always.
• case 2 [lij > 0, ljk > 0, and lki > 0]: xi > xj if lij > lki.
• case 3 [lji > 0, lik > 0, and lkj > 0]: xi > xj if lji < lkj .
5.3. Optional prisoner’s dilemma game
We now consider optional prisoner’s dilemma game whose payoff matrix is
given by Eq. (7). We first assume R > P . In general, the effect of loners on the
strategy selection between C and D disappears if R = P due to the symmetry.
Hence, we need to consider R 6= P case only and assume R > P without loss of
generality. We further assume that R > g. Otherwise, both lCL = σ(R−g) and
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lDL = σ(P − g) are negative and both xC and xD become 0. When we assume
R > P and R > g, two possibilities are left, P > g and P < g.
As before, we consider the difference between xu
C
and xu
D
[given by Eq. (34)]
and let ∆xu = xu
C
−xu
D
. When g < P , both ρ
LC
and ρ
LD
are zero since both lLC
and lLD are negative and we get
∆xu = (ρ
CL
+ ρ
DL
) (ρ
CD
− ρ
DC
) (66)
from Eq. (34). Therefore, x
C
> x
D
when
ρ
CD
> ρ
DC
. (67)
This can be easily understood since abundance of loners becomes zero when
Nw  1 in the g < P case. On the other hands, for the g > P case, ∆xu
becomes
∆xu = ρ
CL
(ρ
CD
+ nρ
LD
− ρ
DC
) . (68)
Therefore, x
C
> x
D
when
ρ
CD
> ρ
DC
− nρ
LD
. (69)
The inequalities (67) and (69) are valid as long as Nw is much larger than
1 for general w. There are three possibilities for Nw to go infinity, w goes to
infinity, N goes to infinity or both go to infinity. Let us first consider the Nw
limit in which N → ∞ first and then w → 0. In this case, the conditions for
x
C
> x
D
on cycles, inequalities (67) and (69) can be written as linear inequalities.
Here, ρ
CD
− ρ
DC
is always proportional to lCD. Also, ρLD becomes proportional
to lLD if g > P . Therefore, we have xC > xD when
σR+ S > T + σP − nσ(g − P )Θ(g − P ), (70)
where σ = 1 for BD and 3 for DB.
Now, let us consider high intensity of selection limit where w itself goes to
infinity. Then, ρ
LD
becomes 1 when g > P since loners dominates defectors and
inequality (69) becomes
ρ
CD
> ρ
DC
− n. (71)
This implies that cooperators are more abundant than defectors always for large
w if n > 1 since ρ
DC
cannot be larger than 1.
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6. Optional game with simplified prisoner’s dilemma
To further clarify how spatial structure and optionality of the game affect
the success of cooperation, we study a optional version of a simplified prisonser’s
dilemma, in which cooperators pay a cost c to generate a benefit b for the other
player. This simplified prisoner’s dilemma is also known as the donation game
or the prisoner’s dilemma with equal gains from switching. Here, we consider
the n = 1 optional game with a simplified prisoner’s dilemma, whose payoff
matrix is given by
C D L
C
D
L

b− c − c g
b 0 g
g g g
 . (72)
Here, g is the payoff for a loner (for staying away from a game) and b and c are
the benefit and cost of the cooperation respectively. We assume that the cost
to participate the game, g, is positive but less than the benefit of cooperation
and consider parameter regions of 0 < c < b and 0 < g < b.
For the simplified PD game, we have R = b−c, S = −c, T = b and P = 0 and
the condition for x
C
> x
D
in the wN limit, given by inequality (55), becomes
c <
N − 6
5N − 6 b=¯
b
5
+O(1/N) (73)
for BD and MP, and
c <
7N − 24
11N − 24 b=¯
7b
11
+O(1/N) (74)
for DB. Note that the condition for x
C
> x
D
is independent of g, as we saw earlier
in Section 4.3. In the wN limit, the condition for x
C
> x
D
mainly depends on
the frequency of loners, which is roughly 1/3 regardless of g values.
On the other hand, in the Nw limit, inequality (70) becomes
g > 2c (75)
for BD and
g >
4
3
(c− b/2) (76)
for DB.
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Now we consider the large w limit (w  1). First, note that the condition
for x
C
> x
D
, given by inequality (69), becomes
ρ
CD
> ρ
DC
− ρ
LD
(77)
when n = 1. The fixation probabilities, ρ
CD
, ρ
DC
and ρ
LD
can be easily cal-
culated from Eq. (19) for large w. For BD, ρ
CD
, ρ
DC
and ρ
LD
become e−cNw,
1−e−(b+2c)w and 1−e−gw respectively for sufficiently large w and inequality (77)
becomes
e−cNw > e−gw − e−(b+2c)w. (78)
Since, e−gw is larger than e−(b+2c)w when g < b, inequality (77) cannot be
satisfied for large population (N > g/c). In other words, x
D
is always larger
than x
C
for BD in the w → ∞ limit. It is worthwhile to note how strongly
strategy selection depends on the number of loner types for large w. As discussed
before, cooperators are more abundant than defectors if the types of loners, n is
larger than 1. On the other hand, for n = 1, defectors are more abundant than
cooperators as long as 0 < g < b.
For DB, we get similar results for ρ
CD
and ρ
LD
. As w goes to infinity, ρ
CD
becomes zero while ρ
LD
becomes 2/3. On the other hand, ρ
DC
depends on the
benefit to cost ratio. It is 2/3 if c is larger than b/2 and zero otherwise. Hence,
cooperators are more abundant than defectors when c < b/2.
For MP, we calculate fixation probabilities directly using Eq. (18) in the limit
of w →∞ and find that ρ
CD
/ρ
DC
becomes 1 + e−wc − e−wg for large w. Hence,
cooperators are more abundant than defectors when g > c.
This simplified game allows us to examine how spatial structure and option-
ality of the game combine to support cooperation.
7. Numerical analysis
We have analyzed the conditions for strategy selection analytically in the two
extreme limits of selection intensity, w → 0 and w → ∞ in the zero mutation
rate. Here, we first we obtain conditions for x
C
> x
D
in the simplified game
(72) numerically for finite values of w (with low mutation rate), using calculated
abundance from fixation probabilities. Then, we perform a series of Monte Carlo
simulations with small but finite mutation rates. The condition for strategy
selection is obtained numerically using measured abundance in the simulations.
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Figure 1: C-rich (blue-vertical) and D-rich (red-horizontal) regions for BD in the c-g pa-
rameter space. Population size is N = 104 and selection intensities are (a) w = 10−6, (b)
w = 10−2, (c) w = 1, and (d) w = 10. Black lines in (a), and (b) are given by c = 1/5 and
g = 2c respectively.
7.1. Numerical comparison of abundance of cooperators and defectors
We solve the inequality x
C
> x
D
numerically using abundance given by
Eq. (34) with n = 1 and investigate how the boundaries between C-rich and D-
rich regions in the parameter space change as the selection intensity, w varies.
Without loss of generality, we set b = 1 and investigate the parameter space
given by 0 < c < 1 and 0 < g < 1. The boundaries are obtained by finding c
which satisfies x
C
= x
D
for a given g.
In Fig. 1, we draw C-rich and D-rich regions for BD by blue-vertical and
red-horizontal lines respectively for four different values of selection intensities.
C-rich regions in (a) and (b) are consistent with the analysis in the wN limit
[inequality (73)] and in the Nw limit [inequality (75)] respectively. The dark-
dashed lines, given by c = 1/5 and g = 2c, are the boundaries between C-
rich and D-rich regions predicted in the wN and Nw limits respectively. For
w = 10 shown in (d), defectors are more abundant for almost entire region.
This is consistent with the w → ∞ analysis which always predict x
D
> x
C
for
n = 1. For the intermediate value of w = 1 shown in (c), we do not know the
analytic boundary but we observe that the numerical boundary lies between the
boundary for w = 10−2 of (b) and that for w = 10 of (d) as expected.
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Figure 2: C-rich (blue-vertical) and D-rich (red-horizontal) regions for DB in the c-g pa-
rameter space. Population size is N = 104 and selection intensities are (a) w = 10−6, (b)
w = 10−2, (c) w = 1, and (d) w = 10. Black lines in (a), (b), and (d) are given by c = 7/11
g = 4
3
(
c− 1
2
)
, and c = 1/2 respectively.
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Figure 3: C-rich (blue-vertical) and D-rich (red-horizontal) regions for MP in the c-g pa-
rameter space. Population size is N = 100 and selection intensities are (a) w = 10−3, (b)
w = 10−1, (c) w = 1, and (d) w = 10. Black lines in (a) and (d) are given by c = 1/5 and
g = c respectively.
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For DB, we show C-rich and D-rich regions for N = 104 in Fig. 2. As in
Fig. 1, they are represented by blue-vertical and red-horizontal lines respectively
for four different values of selection intensities. C-rich regions in (a) and (b)
coincide with the predictions for the wN and Nw limits respectively. The dark-
dashed lines, given by c = 7/11 and g = 43
(
c− 12
)
, are the boundaries between
C-rich and D-rich regions predicted in the wN and Nw limits respectively. For
w = 10 shown in (d), cooperators are more abundant if c < 1/2 as predicted in
the w →∞ limit. As in the case of BD, we do not know the analytic boundary
for the intermediate value of w = 1 shown in (c). Yet, at least, we confirm that
the numerical boundary lies between the boundary in the Nw limit and that in
the w →∞ limit.
In Fig. 3, we show C-rich and D-rich regions for MP by blue-vertical and
red-horizontal lines respectively. For MP, we do not have an analytic expres-
sion for the fixation probability in a closed form. Hence we need to calculate
fixation probabilities directly from Eq. (18). Due to numerical cost for calculat-
ing abundance, which increases rapidly with N , we investigate relatively small
population of N = 100. However, they seem to be big enough to confirm the
analytic prediction of the boundaries between C-rich and D-rich regions in the
wN limit and in the large w limit. The dark-dashed lines in (a) and (d), given
by c = 1/5 and g = c, are the predicted boundaries in the wN and large w
limits respectively.
7.2. Combined effects of optionality and spatial structure
Now, let us compare the effects of the option to be loners on the structured
population (BD and DB) to those on the well-mixed population (MP). It is
immediately clear that the effects of spatial structure depend on the update
rule. Comparing Figures 1 and 3, we see that BD updating does not support
cooperation, in accordance with findings from other models (Ohtsuki & Nowak,
2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2014) In panels 1(a) and 3(a), where
Nw = 0.1, the C-rich regions for BD and MP appear to coincide. This accords
with our results that, in the wN limit, the condition for xC > xD is c < b/5 for
both MP and BD (see Section 6). In the other panels of Figures 1 and 3, we see
that the C-rich regions for BD are smaller than those for MP, suggesting that
BD updating actually impedes cooperation relative to its success in a well-mixed
population.
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DB updating is generally favorable to cooperation, as can be seen by com-
paring Figures 2 and 3. In the wN limit, for example, the condition for xC > xD
is c < 7b/11 under DB updating (see Section 6), which is less stringent than
the corresponding condition for MP, c < b/5. These conditions correspond ap-
proximately to the C-rich regions shown in Figrues 2(a) and 3(a). However, we
find that as w increases, the C-rich regions for DB do not necessarily contain
those for MP. In other words, for large selection intensity, there are parameter
combinations under which cooperation is favored in a well-mixed population but
disfavored on the cycle with DB updating. This effect is most visible in Figures
2(d) and 3(d), but it can also be seen in 2(c) and 3(c). In the w →∞ limit, we
found (Section 6) that cooperation is favored for MP if c < g, while it is favored
for DB for c < b/2. Either one of these conditions can be satisfied while the
other fails, as can be seen (approximately) in Figures 2(d) and 3(d).
Optionality of the game and spatial structure (with DB updating) are two
mechanisms that support cooperation. Do these mechanisms combine in a syn-
ergistic way? We find little evidence that they do. Let us consider first the wN
limit. With spatial structure alone (DB updating with n = 0 loner strategies),
cooperation succeeds if c < b/2. With optionality alone (MP with n = 1), co-
operation succeeds if c < b/5. With both optionality and spatial structure (DB
with n = 1), the condition is c < 7b/11, and we observe that the 7b/11 threshold
is less than the sum b/2 + b/5 = 7b/10 of the thesholds corresponding to the
the two mechanisms acting alone. The lack of synergy is even more apparent as
the selection intensity w increases, since, as noted above, there are parameter
combinations for which cooperation is favored for MP but disfavored for DB.
7.3. Effects of selection intensity
Let us now take a closer look at the effects of selection intensity. As shown
in Fig. 1-3, the boundary between C-rich region and D-rich region changes
as the selection intensity, w varies. In other words, selection intensity may
switch the rank of strategy abundance for some regions of parameter space
as recently reported (Wu et al., 2013). In Fig. 4, we show selection intensity
dependence of abundance for a couple of different pairs of c and g. Abundance
is numerically calculated using Eq. (28) with N = 104 for BD and DB. For
MP, we consider N = 100 due to numerical cost. In the left panels, we choose
parameters c and g such that cooperators are more abundant than defectors
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Figure 4: Selection intensity, w, dependence of abundance, x, of cooperators (blue) and
defectors (red) for BD [(a) and (b)], DB [(c) and (d)], and MP [(e) and (f)]. Abundance is
numerically calculated using Eq. (28) with N = 104 for BD and DB, and N = 100 for MP.
The benefit of cooperation, b, is 1. The costs for a game and a cooperative play, denoted by
g and c respectively, are shown in the figures. Selection intensity w [x-axis] is shown in a log
scale while abundance x [y-axis] is shown in a linear scale. Abundance of loners (not shown)
is given by xL = 1− xC − xD .
(x
C
> x
D
) in the wN limit but change abundance order (x
D
> x
C
) in the Nw
limit (for BD and DB) or large w limit (for MP). For (a) BD, (c) DB, and
(e) MP, we choose (c, g) = (0.1, 0.1), (0.55, 0.1), and (0.1, 0.1) respectively and
find “crossing intensity”, wc. Population remains as C-rich phase for w < wc
where wc is around 0.0005, 0.4, and 0.08 for (a), (c), and (e) respectively. In the
right panels, we consider the opposite cases and choose parameters such that
defectors are more abundant in the wN limit but becomes less abundant in the
Nw limit (for BD and DB) or large w limit (for MP). For (b) BD, (d) DB, and
(f) MP, we choose (c, g) = (0.25, 0.6), (0.655, 0.215), and (0.3, 0.5) respectively.
For BD and DB, cooperators seem to be more abundant only in the Nw limit.
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Figure 5: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for BD with N = 50 and w = 0.002 for four
different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green
square symbols represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are
abundance of Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
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Figure 6: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for DB with N = 50 and w = 0.002 for four
different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green
square symbols represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are
abundance of Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
They are less abundant than defectors for large w limit as well as in the wN
limit. In other words, there are two crossing intensities, wc1 and wc2 , such that
x
C
is larger than x
D
only for wc1 < w < wc2 . They are given by wc1 = 0.0003
and wc2 = 0.25 for (b) and wc1 = 0.001 and wc2 = 0.04 for (d). For MP shown
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in (f), there seems to be only one crossing point around at w = 0.1.
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Figure 7: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for MP with N = 50 and w = 0.002 for four
different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green
square symbols represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are
abundance of Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
7.4. Simulation with finite mutation rate
Abundance of Eq. (28) is calculated in the low mutation limit using the
fixation probabilities. After the invasion of a mutant to the mono-strategy
population, the possibility of further mutation during the fixation is ignored.
Strictly speaking, this is valid only when the mutation rate u goes to zero.
Here, we measure the abundance of three strategies, x
C
, x
D
, and x
L
by Monte
Carlo simulations with a small but finite mutation rate and compare them with
abundance of Eq. (28).
We start from a random arrangement of three strategies C, D, and L on a
cycle (BD and DB) or a complete graph (MP) with N sites. Population evolves
with BD, DB, or MP updating. The mutation probability of the offspring is u;
it bears its parent strategy with probability 1 − u and takes one of the other
two strategies with probability u. In the mutation process, both strategies have
equal chances, i.e., probability of u/2 for each.
To get statistical properties, we perform M = 6 × 104 independent sim-
ulations and calculate the average frequencies of strategies. We monitor the
time evolution of the average frequencies and see if the population evolves to
a steady state in which average frequency remains constant. In the ensemble
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Figure 8: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for BD with N = 50 and w = 0.2 for four different
values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green square symbols
represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are abundance of
Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
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Figure 9: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for DB with N = 50 and w = 0.2 for four different
values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green square symbols
represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are abundance of
Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
of steady states, we believe that the probability distribution of frequencies are
stationary. For a single simulation, frequencies in the population may oscillate
through mutation-fixation cycles for small mutation rates. However, the ensem-
ble average of M independent simulations effectively provides mean frequencies
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equivalent to time average over many fixations. We call this mean frequency as
abundance.
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Figure 10: Abundance xC , xD , and xL vs. c for MP with N = 50 and w = 0.2 for four
different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green
square symbols represent the xC , xD , and xL respectively. Blue, red, and green solid lines are
abundance of Eq. (28). Mutation rate is u = 0.0002.
Time to reach a steady state from the random initial configuration increases
rapidly with population size N . Hence, we simulate relatively small population
of N = 50. We use mutation rate u = 0.0002 such that Nu = 0.01 in all
simulations.
We first measure abundance of cooperators, x
C
, defectors, x
D
, and loners, x
L
in the small Nw regime with Nw = 0.1. Abundance versus cost, x-c plots are
shown in Fig. 5, 6, and 7 for BD, DB, and MP respectively. For each updating
process, we simulate population dynamics with 21 different values of c, c = 0.,
0.05, . . . , 1, for each of four different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d)
0.6. Blue plus, red cross, and green square symbols represent the x
C
, x
D
, and x
L
respectively. They are compared with abundance of Eq. (28), calculated using
fixation probabilities, which are represented by blue, red, and green solid lines.
We first note that the abundance of all strategies are around 1/3 as expected in
the wN limit. Measured data from simulations are consistent with abundance of
Eq. (28) except a tiny but systematic deviation. When abundance is larger than
1/3, measured data tend to stay below the lines while they seem to stay above
the lines when it is smaller than 1/3. These deviations seem to come from the
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fact that we use finite mutation rate (u = 0.0002) instead of infinitesimal rate.
Random mutations make abundance move to the average value (1/3) regardless
of its strategy. Except this small discrepancy, simulation data seem to follow all
features of calculated abundance of Eq. (28). For example, x
D
and x
L
increase
linearly and x
C
decreases linearly with increasing c. Especially, we note that
crossing points of x
C
and x
D
are independent of g as predicted. x
C
and x
D
meet
near c = 1/5 for BD and MP, and near c = 7/11 ' 0.64 for DB.
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Figure 11: Normalized abundance difference between cooperators and defectors, r = (xC −
xD )/(xC + xD ) in the small Nw regime with N = 50 and w = 0.002 (Nw = 0.1), for (a) BD,
(b) DB, and (c) MP. Mutation rate is u = 0.0002. The vertical blue and the horizontal red
paintings represent C-rich and D-rich regions respectively. The dashed line is the boundary
for xC = xD in the low mutation limit of u→ 0.
Simulation data for the large Nw also follow the predicted abundance of
Eq. (28) quite well. Figures 8, 9 and and 10 show x-c plots for BD, DB, and
MP respectively for w = 0.2 (Nw = 10). As before, x
C
, x
D
, and x
L
versus c
graphs are represented by blue plus, red cross, and green square symbols respec-
tively for four different values of g, (a) 0, (b) 0.2, (c) 0.4, and (d) 0.6. They are
compared with calculated abundance of Eq. (28), shown by blue, red, and green
solid lines. As before, we observe small but systematic discrepancies between
simulation data and predicted abundance of Eq. (28). Measure abundance def-
erence between (different) strategies are smaller than the predictions. This can
be understood from the fact that mutations reduce the abundance difference be-
tween strategies. Aside from this systematic deviation, simulation data follow
the features of predicted abundance very well.
We now investigate C-rich and D-rich regions in the parameter space of c
and g and compare them with those in the low mutation limit. We first measure
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x
C
and x
D
for 21×21 different c-g pairs in r ∈ [0 1] and g ∈ [0 1] with intervals of
0.05. Then, we plot a normalized abundance difference between cooperators and
defectors, r = (x
C
−x
D
)/(x
C
+x
D
) in color in 21×21 mesh in the c-g parameter
space (Figs. 11 and 12) to illustrate C-rich and D-rich regions. As before, we
use population of N = 50 with mutation rate u = 0.0002. The blue-vertical and
the red-horizontal paintings represent C-rich and D-rich regions respectively.
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Figure 12: Normalized abundance difference between cooperators and defectors, r = (xC −
xD )/(xC + xD ) in the large Nw regime with N = 50 and w = 0.2 (Nw = 10), for (a) BD,
(b) DB, and (c) MP. Mutation rate is u = 0.0002. The vertical blue and the horizontal red
paintings represent C-rich and D-rich regions respectively. The dashed line is the boundary
for xC = xD in the low mutation limit.
Figure 11 shows the normalized abundance difference, r in the small Nw
regime for the three processes with w = 0.002 (Nw = 0.1). As predicted by the
panels (a) in Fig. 1-3, blue-rich region changes to red-rich region as c increases,
more or less, uniformly regardless of g values. The phase boundaries calculated
in the low mutation limit are shown in black-dashed lines. Those lines locate
near c = 1/5 for BD and MP and near c = 7/11 for DB updating and they are
consistent to the boundaries between two colors.
Boundaries (of C-rich and D-rich regions) obtained from the simulations
for the large Nw regime are also consistent with those calculated in the low
mutation limit. Figure 12 shows the normalized abundance difference, r in color
for the three processes with w = 0.2 (Nw = 10) in the c-g parameter space.
As in Fig. 11, the blue-vertical and the red-horizontal paintings represent C-
rich and D-rich regions respectively. The phase boundaries calculated in the
low mutation limit are shown in black-dashed lines. They are consistent with
color boundaries quite well expect for large g for BD updating. We observe
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that cooperators favored over defectors for wider range of c for large g for BD
updating. However, the absolute abundance of cooperators is small (although
it is still larger than x
D
) when g is large, since loners prevail the population.
8. Conclusion
We have analyzed strategy selection in optional games on cycles and on
complete graphs and found a non-trivial interaction between volunteering and
spatial selection.
For 2 × 2 games on cycles using exponential fitness, we have presented a
closed form expression for the fixation probability for any intensity of selection
and any population size. Using this fixation probability, we have found the
conditions for strategy selection analytically in the limits of weak intensity of
selection and large population size. We have presented results for two orders of
limits: (i) w → 0 followed by N → ∞ (which we call the wN -limit) and (ii)
N → ∞ followed by w → 0 (which we call the Nw-limit). In the first case we
have wN  1; in the second we have Nw  1. We have also obtained numerical
results for finite w in the low mutation limit.
According to our observations, increasing the number of loner strategies
relaxes the social dilemma and promotes evolution of cooperation. Increasing
the number of loner strategies is equivalent to increasing mutational bias toward
loner strategies. More loner strategies (or equivalently, more bias in mutation
toward loners) favors cooperation by enabling loners to invade defector clusters
and facilitate the return of cooperators. In the limit of an infinite number
of loner strategies the social dilemma is completely resolved for any selection
intensity. For high intensity of selection (w  1), the social dilemma can be
fully resolved if there is mutational bias toward loner strategies (or there are
more than one loner strategies).
While optionality of the game and spatial population structure both support
cooperation, we have not found evidence of synergy between these mechanisms.
This lack of synergy appears due to the fact that these mechanisms act in
different ways. Spatial structure supports cooperation by allowing cooperators
to isolate themselves, while optionality supports cooperation by allowing loners
to infiltrate defectors. Neither mechanism appears to improve the efficacy of
the other. In fact, for strong selection (the w → ∞ limit) these mechanisms
appear to counteract one another, in that there are parameter combinations for
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which coopeation is favored in the well-mixed population but disfavored for DB
updating on the cycle.
We speculate that the role of loner strategies in relaxing social dilemmas,
which we observe in our study, is qualitatively valid for games on general graphs.
Since the population structures in our study, cycles and complete graphs, are
at the two extreme ends of the spectrum of spatial structures, we expect loner
strategies in optional games on other graphs also to relax social dilemma. The
relaxation effect of volunteering increases as more loner strategies are available.
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